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Tweet The Janus choice: It appears in official government reports and has been cited by the defense secretary in articles and speeches. However, it is not clear this usage is based on a common understanding of what a hybrid threat or hybrid warfare entails.
Hence, this article details an array of definitions and debates their merits and an alternative concept — compound war. It also provides a preliminary overview of ongoing historical study related to this issue. Some colleagues resist new adjectives and prefer to retain oversimplified depictions of warfare in two distinct bins: I do not share their concerns about new adjectives if they help us think about, debate and prepare for the future.
I have greater concerns about preparing for the future by just looking backward. I fear we face a more complex phase in the ever-evolving character of modern conflict, and that a Janus-like approach would allow us to better understand modern conflict and better prepare our operating forces for success.
We need a sound appreciation of history, and we need to understand the ever-evolving character of the emerging future all at the same time. In short, as warfare evolves, which Clausewitz reminds us it will do in every age, our professional lexicon should evolve, too.
Gian Gentile of the U. Military Academy posed a number of unique insights into the debate about future threats. Neither author found the construct clear or of much value. Nathan Freier of the Center for Strategic and International Studies was one of the originators of the hybrid warfare construct when he worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense on the national defense strategy.
This strategy noted that in the future, the most complex threats would be combinations of these four.
Dave Kilcullen is another advocate. Yet, he emphasizes combinations of irregular modes of conflict, including civil wars, insurgency and terrorism. Other contributors to hybrid wars find more utility in conceptualizing the hybrid threat in terms of how the adversary is organized or his legal status states and nonstate actors as proxies.
Many military theorists are uncomfortable with this element and do not want to deal with something our culture curtly dismisses as a law enforcement matter.
But the nexus between criminal and terrorist organizations is well-established, and the rise of narco-terrorist and nefarious transnational organizations that use smuggling, drugs, human trafficking, extortion, etc.
The importance of poppy production in Afghanistan reinforces this assessment. Additionally, the growing challenge of gangs as a form of disruptive force inside America and in Mexico portends greater problems down the road.
I define a hybrid threat as: Any adversary that simultaneously and adaptively employs a fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, terrorism and criminal behavior in the battle space to obtain their political objectives.
There are a number of issues raised by my definition. These include five distinct elements of the definition: Does the force have to simultaneously employ four different modes of conflict or demonstrate the capacity to employ all four during a campaign?
Does the force have to fuse different forces, regular and irregular, into the theater or must it mix different modes of conflict? How much coordination qualifies and at what level of war?
Does an actor have to mix all four modes, or are three out of four sufficient to make it hybrid? Is criminality a deliberate mode of conflict, or simply a source of income or support for gangs and the Taliban? My definition incorporates these elements, so my own determination on these questions should be clear.
However, the plethora of definitions in the literature is generating the perception of vagueness. Over the past few years, I have delved deeper into a number of case histories.
Huber notes that great captains have often been frustrated by guerrilla warfare that is used in concert with a regular force.
In compound war CWthere is a deliberate simultaneous use of a regular main force with dispersed irregular forces.
This increases the command-and-control, logistics and security problems for the CW commander, making him risk averse and slower. He also notes that there are degrees of coordination, and that sometimes the coordination is limited or simply inadvertent.I spend a lot of time reading books and essays about technology; more specifically, books and essays about technology history and criticism.
Yet, I am often struck by how few of the authors of these works even bother defining what they mean by “technology.” I find that frustrating because, if.
“Justice in the Bible” BY RICHARD J. CLIFFORD, S. J. Published in Jesuit Education Conference Proceeding on the Future of Jesuit Higher Education.
EVOLUTION TRENDS The "INFORMATION AGE" & its Evolution into the "Holographic Age" Challenges & Realistic Goals For Survival & Creating A Desirable Future.
Disclaimer: These essays do not necessarily represent the beliefs of any or all of the staff of the Ontario Consultants on Religious rutadeltambor.com fact, since we are a multi-faith group, it is quite likely that the beliefs expressed in these essays will differ from at least some of our staff's opinions.
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The two critical components that will define education for centuries to come will be a.